johnlindquist-claude-hooks
Provides TypeScript-typed hooks for Claude Code lifecycle events including PreToolUse, PostToolUse, and session management.
60
/ 100 · Grade F-D
F-D = below 60 (deductions)
“I need to integrate TypeScript-typed lifecycle hooks into my Claude Code application for managing tool usage and session events.”
johnlindquist-claude-hooks earned Verified status with a trust score of 60/100 (Grade F-D). Adversarial testing produced 7 findings (6 high, 1 medium). Security scan flagged 0 findings. Tier is Verified rather than Certified due to unmitigated findings above severity thresholds.
Trust Score Breakdown
Eight weighted signals composing the aggregate trust score
Scheme v2.0 · Weights provisional · Consumer confirmations and uptime use pipeline-derived baselines.
Findings
Security scan results, adversarial testing, and pipeline review
Security Scan — Cisco Skill Scanner
Adversarial Testing — 6 categories, 7 findings
The skill executes shell commands using spawn() with user-provided content that could contain shell metacharacters. Multiple injection points exist: (1) In init.js, the command 'bun .claude/hooks/index.ts' is constructed and executed where user could control the working directory or file contents, (2) The skill runs 'bun init -y' and 'bun add -d @types/node' in user-controlled directories, (3) File paths from user input are used directly in fs operations and command construction without sanitization.
The skill contains multiple instructions that direct the agent to perform system-level modifications outside the project scope, including global package installation, system PATH modification, and shell profile alterations.
The skill automatically executes commands with force flags and bypasses user confirmation in several scenarios, including overwriting existing files and running package installations without user interaction.
The skill includes session tracking functionality that logs hook execution data and payloads to system temp directory. While this appears to be for debugging purposes, it could inadvertently capture sensitive information from tool usage or notifications.
The skill instructions include a curl command to install Bun runtime from an external URL (https://bun.sh/install). While this appears legitimate for the tool's functionality, it represents an undocumented external network dependency that could be a vector for supply chain attacks.
The skill contains a very large amount of code and configuration files (540,201 characters total) that could potentially hide instructions or create confusion about the actual scope of the skill. While this appears to be a legitimate CLI tool for Claude hooks, the sheer volume of content makes it difficult to verify all components are necessary and properly documented.
The skill executes 'bun add -d @types/node' and 'bun init -y' commands to install packages that are not listed in the skill's declared dependencies array, which is empty. This bypasses dependency review and could potentially install malicious packages.
Methodology v1.0 · 6 categories · ~55 attack patterns
Behavioral Fingerprint
Runtime performance baseline for drift detection
Samples
8
Error rate
0.0%
Peak memory
— MB
Avg CPU
—%
Response time distribution
Output size distribution
Fingerprint v1.0 · Baseline: Mar 28, 2026 · Status: baseline
Interface
Skill triggers and instruction summary
Activation
No lifecycle events bound
Hook configuration with 0 handler(s)
Scope & Permissions
What this capability can and cannot access — derived from pipeline analysis
no
no
no
no
no
no
Badge & Integration
Embed certification status in your README, docs, or CI pipeline
Certification Notes
Provenance observations from the pipeline
Publisher "johnlindquist" is not verified — first certification from this publisher
No SECURITY.md or SECURITY.txt file found — no published vulnerability reporting process
Single contributor — no peer review evidence in commit history
Signed Artifact
Certification provenance and verification metadata
Pipeline Artifacts
Raw data files from this certification run — downloadable for independent verification
contract.json
Full unsigned contract
stage1-ingest.json
Ingest stage output
stage2a-sbom.json
SBOM generation results
stage2a-vulns.json
Vulnerability scan results
stage2b-security.json
Security scan results
stage3a-functional.json
Functional test results
stage3b-adversarial.json
Adversarial test results
stage3c-fingerprint.json
Behavioral fingerprint
stage4-certify.json
Certification decision + trust score
stage3a-measurements.json
Raw functional test measurements
stage3b-measurements.json
Raw adversarial test measurements
run-log.json
Pipeline execution log
Not all files may be present for every certification.